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In a well-known article devoted to the importance of sufficiency, Harry Frankfurt notes 
in passing the surprising lack of serious exploration of the ideal of fraternity with respect 
to liberty and equality:
In the Sterling Memorial Library at Yale University (which houses 8.5 million 
volumes), there are 1,159 entries in the card catalog under the subject heading 
“liberty” and 326 under “equality”. Under “fraternity”, there are none. This is 
because the catalog refers to the social ideal in question as “brotherliness”. Under 
that heading there are four entries! Why does fraternity (or brotherliness) have 
so much less salience than liberty and equality? Perhaps the explanation is that, 
in virtue of our fundamental commitment to individualism, the political ideals to 
which we are most deeply and actively attracted have to do with what we suppose to 
be the rights of individuals, and no one claims a right to fraternity. It is also possible 
that liberty and equality get more attention in certain quarters because, unlike 
fraternity, they are considered to be susceptible to more or less formal treatment. 
In any event, the fact is that there has been very little serious investigation into 
just what fraternity is, what it entails, or why it should be regarded as especially 
desirable. (Frankfurt, 1987, p. 24)
Frankfurt’s remarks remain pertinent: the political ideal of fraternity is still elusive, even 
if the word is often used rhetorically to signal the need for greater social solidarity. It may 
seem that fraternity does not sit comfortably in the logic of individual rights expressed by 
liberty and equality, and in general within our current focus on distributive justice. Yet by 
the time Frankfurt wrote these lines, Rawls had already suggested a possible interpretation 
of the ideal of fraternity, and perhaps even of a ‘right to fraternity’. In this, he was echoing 
a trend to be found in the French Revolution and throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
century: the use of the idea of fraternity to advocate that all citizens and, in particular the 
most deprived and powerless, should be full participating members of society, sharing in 
decisions, and in benefits from social cooperation. (See David, 1987 and 1992.)
Rawls’s proposal for the ideal of fraternity has met with very little enthusiasm: the only 
comments I have found which have focused on this aspect of his book have been by egalitar-
ian and communitarian critics. Thus G.A. Cohen claims that the acceptance of inequalities 
in Rawls’s principles is inconsistent with relations of fraternity, and Michael Sandel remarks 
that the individualistic logic of justice and rights threatens to undermine valuable communal 
sentiments of fraternity.1 The idea of fraternity is not essential to Rawls’s central arguments 
in A Theory of Justice (19712), and he didn’t return to it, emphasizing instead the idea of 
solidarity. However, his proposal is interesting, for three reasons. First, a too commonplace 
criticism of Rawls’s theory is that it is overly individualistic in form, and focused too much 
on matters of self-interest; were such a criticism valid, then there should be a fundamental 
conflict between the ideal of fraternity and Rawlsian principles: demonstrating the lack of 
conflict helps put in its place this form of critique. Second, in articulating explicitly what 
1 G. A. Cohen’s criticism is developed in a series of articles, the first and the most eloquent of which is (Cohen, 
1992), particularly pp. 321-322. See also Sandel (1982, pp. 32-35).
2 Hereafter A Theory of Justice is abbreviated TJ. Pages and quotes are from the 1999 revised edition.
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Rawls must have had in mind in the passing observations on fraternity scattered throughout 
the text in TJ we can better understand the place of sentiments in a Rawlsian just society. 
Finally, and ultimately most importantly, Rawls’s own position on the question of fraternity 
goes a long way to answering Frankfurt’s challenge: it provides us with at least the contours 
of the political ideal of fraternity.
In the first section, I sketch briefly Rawls’s first comments on fraternity in the chapter on 
‘The tendency to equality’, and the questions they raise. I address the first of my concerns 
above in the following section: focusing on egalitarian criticisms of Rawls, to the effect that 
his conception of fraternity is either incoherent or individualistic and selfish, and as a result 
insufficiently egalitarian; I question whether these criticisms properly understand the role of 
fraternity in Rawls’s theory. The third section is concerned with the second of my concerns: 
I turn to the role of sentiments in Rawlsian theory in order to outline the role that an ideal 
of fraternity, and fraternal sentiments, may play within a just state. In this discussion, I 
emphasize the contrast between sentiments as a basis of political structures and sentiments 
as instruments of support of just society. This furnishes us with the materials to provide an 
answer to Frankfurt, and I conclude by briefly outlining what a reasonable understanding 
of the political ideal of fraternity might consist in.
1. Rawls, Fraternity and Ties of Sentiment
Some aspects of Rawls’s treatment of fraternity are well-known and have been amply 
commented on. In this section, I briefly revisit some of these remarks on fraternity in the 
first part of TJ, highlighting their puzzling structure.
Rawls’s initial lines on the ideal of fraternity are notorious: he notes that ‘In compari-
son with liberty and equality, the idea of fraternity has had a lesser place in democratic 
theory. It is thought to be less specifically a political concept, not in itself defining any of 
the democratic rights.’ Immediately following on from this, Rawls proposes that his differ-
ence principle (DP) constitutes a standard of justice that matches the idea of fraternity, and 
expresses its fundamental meaning from the standpoint of social justice. The ‘principle of 
fraternity’, or DP, stipulates that inequalities in the distribution of primary goods are to be 
‘to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society’. Put succinctly, Rawls’s 
thought is that the difference principle requires that the fruits of social cooperation in society 
be channelled to those who are most in need, the worst off among us; and he adds that this 
is precisely the most natural meaning that we can give to the political ideal of fraternity.
The Difference Principle is one of the key principles for the main political and social 
institutions of society (the Basic Structure of Society) chosen in an Original Position of 
equality, where parties are placed behind a Veil of Ignorance. (They do not know their par-
ticular conception of the good life, their place in society, class position, social status, race 
or ethnic group, sex, intelligence, natural endowments, and so forth.) These principles are:
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal 
basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for 
all; and
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(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to 
be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged 
members of society (this last clause being the Difference Principle).3
Rawls draws a connection early on in TJ, between these principles and the traditional 
political ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. He writes:
We can associate the traditional ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity with 
the democratic interpretation of the two principles of justice as follows: liberty 
corresponds to the first principle, equality to the idea of equality in the first principle 
together with equality of fair opportunity, and fraternity to the difference principle. 
In this way we have found a place for the conception of fraternity in the democratic 
interpretation of the two principles, and we see that it imposes a definite requirement 
on the basic structure of society. (TJ, p. 90, emphasis added)
However, having suggested the idea of a ‘definite requirement’ imposed by his conception 
of fraternity, Rawls does not go on to explain what the obligations of fraternity are; rather, he 
focuses on the kind of sentiments and motivations involved in the idea of fraternity:
The difference principle ... seems to correspond to a natural meaning of fraternity: 
namely, to the idea of not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the 
benefit of others who are less well off. The family, in its ideal conception and often 
in practice, is one place where the principle of maximizing the sum of advantages is 
rejected. Members of a family commonly do not wish to gain unless they can do so 
in ways that further the interests of the rest. Now wanting to act on the difference 
principle has precisely this consequence.’ (TJ, loc. cit., emphasis added)
This extension of personal sentiments to political motivation is not entirely novel, but it 
seems deeply suspicious to many readers of Rawls. Are fraternal political sentiments a nec-
essary pre-condition for the principles to work? In other words, do citizens in a Rawlsian 
society already need to be motivated by fraternal sentiments in order to comply with what 
the difference principle requires? If such sentiments are an essential requirement on citizens 
of the just society, why is their role neither discussed nor emphasized before this point in the 
outline of the theory? If, on the other hand, fraternal feelings are irrelevant to the operation 
of the principles within just society, why bother to mention them at all in relation to the dif-
ference principle? Moreover, the comparison between sentiments among citizens to feelings 
among family members seems severally problematic. Among other concerns, Rawls seems 
to be abandoning the division between principles for personal conduct on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, principles for the Basic Structure of society: the main institutions 
of society and their combined actions and policies. Yet that distinction is at the very core of 
his theory. (‘For us the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more 
3 As formulated in (Rawls, 2001, pp. 42-43). Hereafter Justice as Fairness: A Restatement is abbreviated JFR.
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exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and 
duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.’ TJ, p. 6)
Accordingly, some egalitarian, feminist and communitarian readers see the surprising 
focus on individual sentiments in the paragraphs just quoted of TJ as symptomatic of two 
fundamental defects of the Rawlsian theory of justice. First, Rawls needs individuals to 
already share a sentiment of fraternity in order for society to be just; yet his limiting the 
scope of justice to the manner in which major social institutions distribute fundamental 
rights and duties is narrowly focused on the legal structure to the exclusion of a fraternal 
ethos. Second, by so limiting himself to mere background legal justice, Rawls is committed 
to endorsing injustices which are beyond the scope of the legal structure: in the family, or 
more generally in individual transactions.
Over the years, Rawls’s defenders have responded to these criticisms, emphasizing the 
plausibility of a division of labour between a just background structure and principles for 
individuals. Rawlsians have argued that a plausible theory ought to have space both for 
justice, and for our legitimate individual pursuits and attachments. The justice of back-
ground institutions makes fair transactions between individuals possible, and allows people 
to engage with the partiality of their concerns: their attachments to those they love, their 
individual intellectual interests, what they value.4 However, this form of response leaves 
untouched the role of sentiments within a Rawlsian society. And this leaves in play a more 
fundamental concern. For surely, the idea that a society suitably permeated by a fraternal 
ethos would be more egalitarian, and so more just, seems interesting and plausible. And this 
invites a further critique of Rawls.
Starting from this possibility, critics have raised a number of questions. The most important 
concern the very formulation of principles of justice, and in particular the difference principle. 
Thus critics have pitched Rawls’s sentiments against his principles: they claim that his gnomic 
remarks on fraternity stand in stark contrast to what they see as an endorsement of unjust ine-
qualities through the difference principle. Would people truly motivated by a fraternal concern 
for the least well off, they ask, model their conduct on a principle which justifies inequalities 
in wealth and income, or would they affirm a more egalitarian principle? In other words: isn’t 
aligning the political ideal of fraternity with Rawls’s difference principle a mistake? A second, 
related, set of questions have focused on the scope of principles of justice. Why limit the scope 
of the difference principle just to the basic structure? Some inequalities may be beyond the 
scope of legal structures, such as gender attitudes in the family, for example. But does this 
mean that they should be regarded as beyond the scope of justice? Shouldn’t principles of 
justice apply directly to citizens’ individual conduct? Surely, critics insist, even after citizens 
have duly paid their taxes, there are still some fraternal (and sororal) duties demanding that 
they do what they can for the least well-off. Correspondingly, some authors consider that the 
least well-off must do their bit, and not claim compensation for inequalities which are the result 
of choices they are responsible for. The Rawlsian ideal, by focusing on legal structures rather 
than on principles for individual conduct, this second line of attack concludes, does not give 
us a correct account either of citizens’ responsibilities or of the ideal of fraternity.
4 I have had my say on feminist perspectives in (Munoz-Dardé, 1998). For a Rawlsian take on egalitarianism see 
(Scheffler, 2003). In a spirit more sympathetic to egalitarian criticisms, see also (Estlund, 1998).
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The most interesting and thorough pursuit of these lines of criticism remains that formu-
lated by G.A. Cohen, to whom I turn in the next section. My focus will be on disentangling 
internal and external criticisms that are knotted together in this line of thought. In particular, 
our questions will be: 1) whether Rawls’s lines quoted on the ideal of fraternity reveal a 
tension internal to his theory between the fraternal motivation of individuals who affirm the 
difference principle and the inequalities allowed by that principle and 2) whether a more 
plausible principle ought to be formulated to replace the difference principle which does 
proper justice to the ethos of fraternity. In other words: according to this egalitarian critique, 
would the correct understanding of the ideal of fraternity be more Rawlsian than Rawls, or 
instead an alternative to Rawlsian justice?
2. Cohen’s Fraternity: More Rawlsian than Rawls? An Alternative to Rawlsian Justice?
As anticipated above, G. A. Cohen has more than one line of attack against Rawls’s 
Difference Principle: some of these are addressed to the form and content of principles of 
justice in Rawls, some to their scope, and some to the problem of (fraternal) motivation prior 
to the formulation and operation of principles.
One of the earliest arguments pressed by Cohen concerns the distinction between a basic 
structure to which principles apply and the norms which govern individuals: for Cohen, 
justice is a virtue which should directly require things of individuals, and is not merely a 
matter of institutional structure, concerned with redistribution through taxation. (Cohen, 
1997) The initial focus of Cohen’s egalitarian criticism is on the motivation of individuals 
and how this accords or conflicts with the ideal of fraternity.
It is worth noting first that Cohen’s reading of the Difference Principle takes it to have 
the function of justifying inequalities. Whereas the spirit in which the principle is written 
is rather one of clearly imposing severe constraints on existing inequalities. So, for Cohen, 
what he reads as the justification of inequalities through the Difference Principle is identical 
to the commonplace point made about market economies: even the least well-off in society 
receive benefits if the most talented in society are motivated by hefty salaries to be highly 
productive. Having thus construed the Difference Principle, Cohen comments that it is true 
that the least well-off would be even worse off if incentives were not given: in that sense, 
advantages to the best off have been gained in ways which improve the prospect of the least 
well-off. However, Cohen remarks, if the better off were really motivated by the Difference 
Principle and a spirit of fraternity, they would not insist in being bribed to be productive, 
and so the worse off would be even better off:
A society of maximizers with taxation and regulation dictated by the lax difference 
principle is necessarily preferable from the point of view of the worst off to a laissez-
faire society; but in neither society is the conduct of high fliers consistent with the 
essentially socialist value of fraternity or with motivation informed by the difference 
principle. Rawls must give up either his approval of incentives to the exercise of 
talent or his ideals of dignity, fraternity, and the full realization of persons’ moral 
natures. I think the ideals are worth keeping. (Cohen, 1992, p, 322)
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Later on, Cohen returns to the question of motivation and the tension which he finds 
within Rawlsian theory between the selfish inclinations of well-placed individuals (he calls 
them ‘the talented’) who demand higher rewards to be productive and the ideal of fraternity:
Either the relevant talented people themselves affirm the difference principle or 
they do not. That is: either they themselves believe that inequalities are unjust if 
they are not necessary to make the badly off better off, or they do not believe that 
to be a dictate of justice. If they do not believe it, then their society is not just in 
the appropriate Rawlsian sense, for a society is just, according to Rawls, only if its 
members themselves affirm and uphold the correct principles of justice. 
Apart, then, from the very special cases in which the talented literally could not, as 
opposed to the normal case where they (merely) would not, perform as productively as 
they do without superior remuneration, the difference principle can justify inequality 
only in a society where not everyone accepts that very principle. It therefore cannot 
justify inequality in the appropriate Rawlsian way. (Cohen, 1997, p. 8)
In sum: Cohen’s view is that a more egalitarian society would result if principles of justice 
were directly motivating individuals. In particular those ‘talented’ to produce could choose: 
i) to work hard without special incentives; and ii) to work at occupations which benefit the 
least well-off. Cohen illustrates this thought, and its radically egalitarian implications for 
the ideal of fraternity, with the simple example of two brothers:
Two brothers, A and B, are at benefit levels 6 and 5, respectively, in New York, where 
they live. If they moved to Chicago, their levels would rise to 10 and 6. If they moved 
to Boston, they would rise to 8 and 7. Is fraternity, as Rawls means to characterize 
it, consistent with A proposing that they move to Chicago? If so, it is a thin thing. 
Or is Rawlsian fraternity strictly maximizing? In that case, Boston is the choice, and, 
in a feasible set with no bar to redistribution, equality is the result. (Cohen, 1992, p. 
322, emphasis added)
Cohen’s alternative proposal to Rawls, focused on how just individuals within a just 
society might be motivated, and which he suggests may be more Rawlsian than Rawls, 
seems explicitly focused on the equality of outcomes. The properly fraternal response, for 
Cohen, is one in which the brothers ‘maximize’ what fraternity demands, and in which equal-
ity is the result. Now, it isn’t yet clear how we are to interpret this maximizing conception. 
At an abstract level, we may puzzle over a conception which tells agents to aim at state 
of affairs which have as much equality as possible. Cohen seems to conceive the way in 
which equality in states of affairs polices our actions on a model parallel to that in which 
utilitarians conceive of the welfare of states of affairs. That is: states of affairs are better or 
worse in terms of their closeness to perfect equality. To define a ranking of state of affairs 
from best to worst in virtue of how equal people are presents formal similarities with the 
consequentialism of utilitarianism, and might be just as controversial.5
5 For this point, see my (Munoz-Dardé, 2005)
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Be that as it may, Cohen’s proposal is at first more attractive than that: his view is that 
in a properly fraternal society a more generous distribution would result than Rawls allows 
for, because there would be less inequalities. However, unlike Rawls’s Difference Principle 
which does not establish any distinction among the worst off, Cohen’s egalitarianism is 
severely constrained: it is only the inequality of those who are worse off through no choice 
or fault of their own which matters. Cohen’s exact proposal is that a properly fraternal soci-
ety would be luck-egalitarian: it would eliminate, as far as possible, the effects of involuntary 
inequalities.6 Involuntary inequalities are those that do not appropriately reflect the choices 
of those who suffer them. The idea is that we distinguish between inequalities which are 
a result of choices agents are responsible for, and inequalities which are the result of bad 
brute luck. Justice demands that the impact on people of the latter form of inequalities be 
eliminated, or at least lessened. In other words, Cohen believes that a proper understanding 
of fraternity should a) focus on the fact that it is bad that some, through no fault or choice 
of theirs, are worse off than others and b) motivate us to reduce involuntary inequalities.
The ambition that Cohen and other luck egalitarians share is to delineate a responsibility 
and choice based form of egalitarianism, and it is that form of egalitarianism which Cohen 
reads off from, or into, the ideal of fraternity. Cohen holds that it is objectionable, at least to 
some extent, for some to be worse off than others through no fault, or choice, of their own. 
If one person is worse off than another through no fault or choice of her own, the situation 
is unfair, and hence that the inequality between the two people is objectionable. This focus 
on the value of fairness seems well summarized by Larry Temkin’s claim that egalitarians 
‘generally believe that it is bad for some to be worse off than others through no fault or 
choice of their own. The connection between equality and comparative fairness explains 
both the importance, and limits, of the “no fault or choice” clause.’ (Temkin, 2003, p. 62)
Now, Cohen often presents his own view of fraternity as more Rawlsian than Rawls. 
Clearly the emphasis on equality, fairness and the fate of the least well-off all seem to echo 
core Rawlsian concerns. At the same time, Cohen is critical of Rawlsian egalitarianism. 
How are we to understand the relation between Cohen and Rawls, does the criticism call 
for an internal revision of Rawlsian accounts of justice, or for an entirely different form of 
egalitarianism?
There are in fact two ways in which Cohen’s luck-egalitarianism relates critically to 
Rawls: (a) On the one hand, Cohen wishes to formulate a superior form of egalitarianism, 
free of what is considered problematic in Rawls’s theory, namely the insensitivity of the 
Difference Principle to the distinction between inequalities which are created by voluntary 
6 See Cohen (1989, 916). The term luck egalitarianism is used by Cohen to characterize his own view, but it is 
originally coined by Elizabeth Anderson in her (Anderson, 1999) to bundle together a number of egalitarian 
authors whose views she wished to criticize for their emphasis ‘on correcting a supposed cosmic injustice’. 
Luck egalitarianism, she writes, is ‘the view that the fundamental aim of equality is to compensate people for 
undeserved bad luck—being born with poor native endowments, bad parents, and disagreeable personalities, 
suffering from accidents and illness, and so forth.’ As a result, luck egalitarianism is focused on eliminating 
‘the impact of brute luck from human affairs’. The focus on involuntary inequalities is the commitment of 
authors Anderson described as luck egalitarian: principally G. A. Cohen and Ronald Dworkin, but also Richard 
Arneson, Eric Rakowski, as well as John Roemer. Of those, only G. A. Cohen is happy to borrow the term luck 
egalitarianism to describe his view, namely that ‘accidental inequality is unjust’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 8). See my 
(Munoz-Dardé, 2014), from which the following few paragraphs in the text are retaken, with slight alterations.
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choices and those which are the result of bad brute luck. (b) On the other hand, Cohen’s new 
egalitarianism still has roots in Rawls’s original discussion: Rawls’s focus on fairness and 
on ‘inequalities which are arbitrary from a moral point of view’ is presented as a commit-
ment to eliminating arbitrary inequalities. According to this second reading, Rawls endorses 
one of the core elements of the luck egalitarianism of Cohen: justice demands that we even 
out the effects of brute luck. Moreover, Rawls should accept that the very motivation for 
the Difference Principle, namely the value of fraternity and a concern for the worst-off, is 
inconsistent with inequalities justified by the difference principle.
Which of these ways of telling the story should we prefer? Is Cohen’s conception of 
fraternity a rival theory to Rawls, or rather a more coherent formulation of the core Rawlsian 
doctrine? As we shall see in more detail below, Cohen tries to have things both ways. Can 
he successfully and coherently press both his luck-egalitarianism and his incentives critique?
In Anarchy, State and Utopia, Nozick accuses Rawls of arguing for economic egalitarian-
ism by overemphasizing social contingencies and natural chance, and underestimating the 
centrality and importance of individual responsibility and autonomy. Luck egalitarians echo 
and endorse this criticism. Recall that Rawls’s Difference Principle stipulates that social 
and economic inequalities are just if they are to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged 
members of society. In so stipulating the Difference Principle, Rawls does not introduce a 
distinction between inequalities deriving from choices people have voluntarily made, and 
social and economic inequalities which derive from unchosen features of those who are 
disadvantaged relative to others.
Picking up and expanding on Nozick’s criticism, luck egalitarians such as Cohen com-
plain: i) that the Difference Principle inappropriately rewards those who are responsible for 
their deficit in primary goods, e.g. those able-bodied who choose not to work, or to work 
less hard than others, and ii) that the index of primary goods used in the Difference Principle 
is insensitive to, and fails to compensate for, disadvantages some suffer relative to others 
through no fault of their own. That is, Rawls accepts as just a distribution in which some 
are disadvantaged through brute luck, e.g. because they are handicapped or severely ill.
If the focus is on these two complaints, then the best way of interpreting Cohen’s 
emphasis on fraternity is that his account aims at defining an alternative, more robust, form 
of egalitarianism by accommodating into our principles for distribution such concerns with 
responsibility for the outcome of one’s choices, and with deficits which are the effects of 
bad brute luck.
However, there are other ways in which Cohen addresses the ideals of fraternity and 
equality and these contrast and potentially conflict with this first line of criticism. From this 
other viewpoint, the core concern of luck-egalitarianism (namely, involuntary inequalities) 
is continuous with Rawls’s insistence on fairness and his focus on inequalities which are 
‘morally arbitrary’. The question Cohen raises is how to reconcile the Rawlsian emphasis 
on arbitrary inequalities with the exact formulation of Rawlsian egalitarian principles of 
justice. Cohen’s luck egalitarianism seeks to offer such a reconciliation. By demanding that 
no one be disadvantaged, or advantaged, by arbitrary factors it aims to define an egalitari-
anism truer to the focus on fairness, and so more Rawlsian than Rawls, so to speak. More 
precisely, there are two supposed inconsistencies, internal to Rawlsian fraternity principle, 
that the luck egalitarianism of Cohen aims at resolving:
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i) On the one hand, the Difference Principle is, as mentioned, insensitive to the 
choice/luck distinction. However, Rawls seems to make use precisely of this 
distinction when he argues that the system of natural liberty unjustly allows 
‘natural and social contingencies’ to have a strong impact on distribution:
 ‘[I]ntuitively, the most obvious injustice [of that system] is that it permits 
distributive shares to be improperly influenced by these factors so arbitrary from 
a moral point of view.’ (TJ, pp, 62-63, emphasis added).
ii) On the other hand, Rawls stresses the ‘capacity to take responsibility for our 
ends’ and considers unjust to give a greater share of primary goods to those with 
expensive taste:
 ‘[I]t is regarded as unfair that [those with less expensive taste] should have less 
in order to spare others from the consequences of their lack of foresight and self-
discipline.’ (Rawls, 1999, pp. 369-370.
This treatment of expensive tastes is read by G. A. Cohen through luck egalitarian lenses 
thus: ‘People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise, and if and when they press 
compensation, others are entitled to insist that they themselves bear the cost ‘of their lack of 
foresight or self-discipline’.’ (Cohen, ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’, 913)
To these criticisms, both internal and external, we saw that Cohen adds the view that 
a fraternal, egalitarian ethos should supplement principles of justice: individuals should be 
motivated to minimize inequalities. We are now in a position to return to Rawls and his 
considered views on fraternity: in the next section I shall provide an exegesis and defence 
of his position. Let us however begin with the response to the luck egalitarianism of Cohen.
There is a ready response both to the internal and external criticisms offered to Rawls 
here. A proper understanding of Rawls’s own explanation of the Difference Principle and 
the importance of fraternity does not require us to move beyond Rawls’s own principles to 
the luck egalitarian position favoured by Cohen. Moreover, Cohen’s luck egalitarianism is 
neither a convincing alternative to Rawls, nor a plausible elaboration of the intuitions which 
ground political egalitarian movements.
First, Cohen is mistaken to think that he can best Rawls at his own game. How can 
Rawls’s principles, and in particular the principle of fraternity (or rather the Difference 
Principle), be made consistent with what Rawls himself says about moral arbitrariness, and 
about natural talents, expensive tastes and self-discipline? Does Rawls rely on premises 
regarding choice and luck which the formulation of his principles then contradicts? To these 
questions, Rawlsians briskly retort that Rawls’s arguments support his own principles rather 
than luck egalitarianism. ‘[T]he best explanation of the fact that Rawls’s theory of justice 
does not respect the distinction between choice and circumstances,’ Scheffler writes, ‘is that 
Rawls is not attempting to respect it. He simply does not regard the distinction as having 
the kind of fundamental importance that it has for luck egalitarians.’ (Scheffler, 2003, p. 7)
Let us note that Rawls clearly denies that inequalities which are the result of genetic 
and social luck are unjust, or that they ought to be eliminated: ‘The natural distribution is 
neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular 
position. These are simply natural facts. What is just or unjust is the way that institutions 
deal with these facts.’ (TJ, p. 87) He thus distinguishes between his theory and what he calls 
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‘a principle of redress’, that is ‘the [luck egalitarian] principle that undeserved inequalities 
call for redress’ (TJ, p, 100). Rawls further explains that ‘the difference principle is not of 
course the principle of redress. It does not require society to try to even out handicaps as if 
all were expected to compete on a fair basis in the same race.’ (TJ, p. 101) 
Why, then, does Rawls emphasize the ‘moral arbitrariness’ of facts such as natural 
endowments and social factors? Justice, for Rawls, may not demand the elimination of 
all effects of bad brute luck; nevertheless, he stresses that a society which systematically 
disadvantages some of its members on the basis of morally arbitrary factors, such as their 
natural endowments or the social environment in which they are born, is unjust. This type 
of morally arbitrary discrimination can happen through overt exclusion, but also simply 
because contingent social factors may happen to favour an ethnic, gender or social group in 
the distribution of resources. A just society, according to Rawls, addresses these injustices 
at the outset, by redistributing to ensure for all fair and favourable background conditions. 
The priority of fair background conditions and the role of our institutions in insuring that 
they are in place is thus what lies behind the Rawlsian emphasis on the moral arbitrariness 
of certain factors. It constitutes an explanation and defence of the Difference Principle, and 
to the extent that it is here invoked, the ideal of fraternity. To those who claim that they did 
nothing but work hard without violating anybody’s rights, or that they competed in condi-
tions of formal equality of opportunity for positions which required certain talents, and 
so ought to reap the rewards of their efforts, Rawls responds that ‘the kind of limits and 
provisos that in Locke’s view apply to separate transactions of individuals and associations 
in the state of nature are not stringent enough to ensure that fair background conditions are 
maintained.’ (JFR, 53)
A just society for Rawls is not one that meets luck-egalitarian requirements, but rather 
one in which each person is given the opportunities to develop their abilities, and can do 
so with the guarantee of fair equality of opportunities with others similarly talented and 
inclined. What matters is not that the consequences of bad brute luck be as far as possible 
eliminated, nor that life chances be evened out (which, among other things, would require 
the abolition of the family: see TJ, p, 448 and Munoz-Dardé, 1998), nor a fortiori that our 
expensive tastes, however acquired, be satisfied in the same measure as that of others. What 
matters is that all have enough resources to satisfy their interest in pursuing a good life.
In sum, then, there is no internal tension of the sort identified by luck egalitarians in the 
Rawlsian account. Nor, pace Cohen, is there any need to re-incorporate individual responsibil-
ity into that story. In brief, all individuals have two types of responsibilities: first to contribute 
to maintaining favourable background social circumstances; second, to make a sensible use of 
their share of primary goods, without imposing unreasonable demands on others.
This may settle the internal question of consistency within Rawls’s own text: his appeal 
to fraternity should not be seen as inconsistent with the work he sets the Difference Principle 
to. But that doesn’t yet address the more fundamental question: does he properly address 
the concerns bound up in our thoughts about fraternity? Are luck egalitarians truer to our 
intuitive ideals of fraternity and equality than Rawls? 
Certainly Cohen offers no compelling case for this. By comparison with a view focused 
on compensating people for undeserved bad luck, Rawlsian theory is in fact more theo-
retically ambitious. Instead of the main emphasis on choice and luck, it aims at finding 
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room for the multiple values which a well-ordered society must attend to: respect for persons, 
needs, opportunities, fairness, solidarity, fraternity, and so on. Politically, its perspective on 
individual responsibility aims at providing a feasible utopia. It does not ask society to aim 
at the compensation of all disadvantages that derive from unchosen features, all accidental 
inequalities (something that cannot be fully delivered anyway). Nor does it have the sometimes 
implausibly harsh consequence that people should bear the full price of their choices, and be 
denied compensation for disadvantages that result from these choices.
The Rawlsian account constitutes a multifaceted theoretical take on the political ideals of 
equality and fraternity. In line with these ideals, it explains and motivates the need to elimi-
nate many types of unjust inequalities. Moreover, a Rawlsian society is prepared to repair 
inequalities which are not purely the result of brute luck. Contrary to the contentions by luck 
egalitarians, a Rawlsian society measures up entirely to the standards of political egalitarianism 
in its distributional and social policies. Indeed, once one reflects on the concerns of political 
egalitarianism, a Rawlsian society arguably gets closer to their ends than any society guided 
by luck egalitarian policies would. 
3. Fraternity, Equality, and Rawlsian Sentiments
However, even if a fraternal society is not luck egalitarian, it may remain true that a fra-
ternal sentiment, or motivation, is missing from the Rawlsian picture, and that would be the 
kernel of truth in Cohen’s critique. We saw earlier that Cohen has the following thought: if 
the Difference Principle encourages people with abilities and drive, the ‘talented’, to demand 
higher rewards than others in order to be productive, then it encourages them to act moved 
not by fraternity, but rather by self-interest. What the ‘talented’ demand is to be substantially 
better paid than others in order to be productive. In so doing they are formally complying with 
the letter of the Difference Principle: the least well-off are better off than they would be if the 
talented worked less productively: say because of a trickle-down effect. But at the same time 
the ‘talented’ flout the ‘natural meaning’ attributed by Rawls to fraternity: that of ‘not wanting 
to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who are less well off.’ (See 
Cohen 1982, pp. 8 and 16ff.)
Notice that this complaint of an internal tension does not need to focus on inequalities as 
such, but rather on plight of the badly off, and on the kind of fraternal sentiments, or senti-
ments of benevolence that the better off should have if moved by the spirit of the different 
principle. (Recall Cohen’s example cited above of the two brothers facing the move to Chicago 
or to Boston.)
As mentioned earlier, there are at several aspects to this objection against Rawls’s treatment 
of fraternity. We can distinguish between (i) the view that different principles would result if 
fraternal sentiments were given their due place at the outset, so to speak and (ii) the idea that 
the principles of justice are merely formal, i.e. that they need to be supplemented by fraternal 
sentiments.
As regards (i), Cohen does not really distinguish between egalitarian principles and what 
the idea of fraternity requires: on his view, a fraternal society would be luck-egalitarian. This 
is his substitution for Rawls’s difference principle in TJ that we have discussed, and rejected, 
above. However, the additional thought, as per (ii) is that even if the Difference Principle 
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were the right principle of justice, something would still be missing from a Rawlsian theory 
of justice. And this is the internal tension that Cohen finds between Rawls’s limitation of 
principles to the basic structure of society, on the one hand, and Rawls’s own espousal of the 
ethos of fraternity, on the other. To be exact, there are two targets of criticism. First, individu-
als are not properly motivated by the ideal of fraternal solidarity in the Rawlsian story. And 
second, as a result of this, a social ethos of fraternity cannot be cultivated among citizens.
We should acknowledge that there is something plausible in this position, and in the aspi-
ration to formulate an ideal of fraternity which can be espoused by individuals, and which 
can also inform social cooperation between them. Cohen’s insight is that a merely legal and 
‘structural’ reading of Rawlsian principles is an impoverished conception of justice. Rawlsian 
principles of justice may be conceived to apply to the Basic Structure, but that surely cannot 
mean that justice is limited to mere legal constraints such as taxation. 
However, when we treat these aspirations as a critique of Rawls, it becomes less compel-
ling. There is no reason within Rawls’s own approach to adopt the strictly ‘structural’ reading, 
with its overly narrow understanding of what justice demands. Indeed, a proper attention to 
Rawls’s lines on fraternity in the third part of TJ shows such a reading is inadequate to the text. 
To recognize the proper role of fraternity in Rawls’s thinking, we need to separate out 
questions about what might be our initial motivations to enter into a just society, or to act 
justly, and what sentiments we might have within a well-ordered society which are such as to 
preserve or make stable just ways of living.
One problem we saw with the comments Rawls makes in the first part of TJ regarding the 
ideal of fraternity is that there is no explanation of the relation between definite moral and 
legal requirements imposed by the Difference Principle and fraternal sentiments. However, in 
the third part of TJ, Rawls returns to fraternity, and there he delineates the connexion between 
sentiments and requirements of fraternity. Rawls provides this elucidation in the section 
devoted to stability (§ 76): briefly, he suggests that sentiments of fraternity can be cultivated 
through principles which can be justified to all, and in particular to the least well-off. The 
suggestion, therefore, is that an ethos of fraternity is what results from appropriately justifiable 
principles of justice. And in turn, Rawls sees the existence of a fraternal ethos as one of the 
necessary elements of stability of just principles.
Rawlsian contractualism is anti-consequentialist: it contrasts with theories which are 
focused on features of state of affairs, such as that they maximize welfare or equality. 
However, one political impulse that Rawls shares with utilitarians and with egalitarians is 
that a just society is one in which the needs of the least well off receive proper attention. 
In Rawlsian terms, a just society is one in which social cooperation guarantees to each 
individual, especially the worst off, an adequate scheme of liberties, opportunities and 
resources to flourish. In order to fulfil that role a conception of justice needs to be stable: 
just institutions need to be preserved. ‘To insure stability [of a just scheme of cooperation] 
men must have a sense of justice or a concern for those who would be disadvantaged by 
their defection, preferably both.’ (TJ, p, 435)
More specifically, Rawls considers that three conditions must be fulfilled for a concep-
tion of justice to be stable: it must be ‘perspicuous to our reason, congruent with our good, 
and rooted not in abnegation but in affirmation of the self.’ (TJ, p. 436) Thus in contrast 
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to utilitarianism (and also to any egalitarianism similarly focused on states of affairs), 
Rawlsian contractualism is a conception of the political order such that:
(i) it is justifiable to each person: each individual can have a clear awareness of the 
reasons in support of the political principle of fraternity;
(ii) claims of individuals cannot be neglected or overridden for the sake of aggregated 
benefits or state of affairs; and
(iii) individuals can adopt it and conform to it without abnegation, self-denial or 
excessive sacrifice.
All three aspects are essential, and contrast with rival views such as utilitarianism or the 
egalitarianism of luck egalitarians. There are several contrasts with rival views. First, Rawl-
sian fraternity does not appeal to the impersonal goodness of state of affairs (the aggregate of 
well-being, or maximizing equality). In its place, it formulates an ideal of reciprocity which 
builds on our capacity of appreciation of the good of others as echoing our own claims. 
Second, there is no ad hoc balance to be stricken between altruism understood as abnegation 
and selfish claims of individuals. Instead, others with whom we share social institutions, 
caught in the same boat as us, so to speak, can quite properly make demands on us for their 
needs to be met; and we in turn can expect and demand that our needs should also be met 
by others. In this context, the idea of fraternity is essentially a reciprocal concern for the 
good of each person. Reciprocity of concern aims at giving each person ‘a secure sense of 
their own worth’, and that in turn ‘forms the basis for the love of humankind’ (TJ, p. 438). 
The effect of [the difference principle and its relation to the idea of fraternity] is 
to heighten the operation of the reciprocity principle. As we have noted, a more 
unconditional caring for our good and a clearer refusal by others to take advantage 
of accident and happenstance, must strengthen our self-esteem; and this greater good 
must in turn lead to a closer affiliation with persons and institutions by way of an 
answer in kind. (TJ, p. 437)
For Rawls, ideals of reciprocity and solidarity that the Difference Principle embodies 
offer protection to each individual. In addition, the public knowledge that our shared institu-
tions are built to meet the needs of each individual encourages the development of an ethos 
of fraternity. 
Rawls can agree, therefore, that ‘justice requires an ethos governing daily choice which 
goes beyond one of obedience to just rules’ (Cohen, 2000: 136). But unlike his critics he 
offers a compelling version of the possibility and genesis of such an ethos.7
7 Compare the effects of lacking accounts of motivation in utilitarianism: ‘The concern which is expressed 
for all persons by counting each as one (by weighing everyone’s utility equally) is weak compared to that 
conveyed by the principles of justice. Thus the attachments generated within a well-ordered society regulated 
by the utility criterion are likely to vary widely between one sector of society and another. Some groups may 
acquire little if any desire to act justly (now defined by the utilitarian principle) with a corresponding loss 
in stability.’ (TJ, p. 437) One contention of my article is that a similar remark holds, a fortiori, for a concern 
with equality as a feature of states of affairs.
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So far, I have presented an exegesis and defence of a Rawlsian conception of the politi-
cal ideal of fraternity, and its attention to an ethos of fraternal relations. I have highlighted 
the relation of the Difference Principle to distributions of resources which are necessary for 
the flourishing of each member of the political community. In conclusion of this section let 
me highlight some aspects which seem particularly attractive of this take on the political 
ideal of fraternity.
Some philosophers see their role as laying down the rules of the ideal city. By contrast, 
Rawls begins from certain features of human societies and hypotheses about our moral psy-
chology to envisage what the characteristics of a just society might be. For Rawls, as for 
Hume, justice is an artificial virtue which is made both possible and necessary by certain 
features of human societies. Like Hume, Rawls considers that human beings are such that 
they have a sense of solidarity and benevolence towards each other; that sentiment is how-
ever weak: hence the need for the artifice that rules of justice provide. This is Rawls’s first 
empirical hypothesis: the fact of a weak sense of benevolence of human beings towards each 
other makes justice both possible and necessary. In the context of each political community, 
this initial sentiment manifests itself in an inclination to meet the needs of the badly-off; 
in the same manner, sisters and brothers in a family often tend to help the badly off among 
them. Call this first rationale ‘the lifeboat’: the idea that morality requires that we meet the 
needs of the badly-off, at least within the political community.
This initial fraternal inclination is however not operative without a favourable institu-
tional framework. Again, Rawls no less than Hume stresses the artificial nature of political 
society and that its virtues lie in this artifice. A political society, if well run, ought to have 
institutions such that the badly-off receive the necessary resources for flourishing. Given 
limited resources, a proper attention to the need of the least well-off will render certain 
inequalities problematic. If some enjoy superfluous goods whilst the needs of others are 
unmet, society is not well run. This tendency towards lesser inequality is supplemented 
by a further thought: if people in a given society cooperate to produce goods and services, 
they should receive a just share of the product of their social cooperation. Call this second 
rationale ‘the boat we built’: fairness requires that the least well-off do as well as possible. 
Enter the principle of fraternity: social and economic inequalities are to be to the greatest 
benefit of the least-advantaged members of society.
To these initial points, Rawls adds two further empirical hypotheses. The first hypothesis 
regards what we all care about or value in the institutions that we live within, namely that 
how they run be justifiable to each and every one of us; that principles meet this condition 
is something we value. The principle of fraternity, or that is to say, the Difference Principle, 
meets that demand for justification. Rather than an exhortation to the better-off that they do 
more to deliver more welfare or to maximize equality, it is a principle that can be shared by 
the better-off and the least well-off: all can see it as a rule which expresses an interest they 
have that society be run to meet the needs of each, the needs of all. (Arguably this empiri-
cal element is what is missing from Kant’s view of the possibility of a just constitution for 
a people of demons.)
The final empirical hypothesis is that the weak sentiment of benevolence present in 
human beings is fortifiable by rules which are publicly justified and regarded as just. Hence 
the idea which we saw in the last section of an ethos of fraternity. The good which results 
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from the Difference Principle is a shared fraternal ethos: an endorsement of shared norms 
of cooperation; and this in turn makes rules of justice more stable, though approval of com-
pliance with the rules. A just society, thinks Rawls, is one in which members shape their 
society together. The have-nots see themselves in a position to claim resources on the basis 
of this collective enterprise: society does not only do the best by them, but it is also a society 
which they partake in shaping. In turn, the haves see it as reasonable for the have-nots to 
make that claim, because they identify with the community as a collective enterprise, and 
see their interest in a well-run society satisfied. Organizing a society alongside the difference 
principle thus results in all seeing themselves as properly belonging. 
Conclusion
At the beginning of this article, I mentioned criticisms which represent Rawlsian theory 
as addressed to selfish motivations, insufficiently egalitarian and deaf to social dimensions of 
a just society. By contrast, we saw that sentiments can play a role not only in the explanation 
of circumstances of justice, and so in the initial conditions from which justice is made pos-
sible and constructed, but also in providing a social glue to keep a just society going once set 
up. This is the key role Rawls attributes to fraternity: sentiments of fraternity do not have a 
foundational role, and are excluded from the description of the veil of ignorance and the way 
we arrive at the Difference Principle; however it has the role of ongoing social cement, and 
so offers the possibility of re-interpreting the double significance of the Difference Principle.
In subsequent work, Rawls abandons any reference to fraternity, and focuses instead on 
solidarity. Fraternity comes associated with other collateral ideas, from the family to reli-
gious and revolutionary sentiments, through the solidarity enjoyed by members of guilds 
in the middle ages. What remains after TJ is the focus on reciprocity and justification of 
institutions to each member of political society, and on the need to find principles which 
leave no one with the sentiment that they are ‘left behind’. And that seems the most plausible 
way of rendering the elusive but appealing political ideal of fraternity.8
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